Ferguson, Kennedy, Kissinger, and Vietnam: A Fresh Look | Chapter 9 | Selected Topics in Humanities and Social Sciences Vol. 6

Ferguson's in-depth biography gives insight into the policies and personalities that led to the United States' full-fledged involvement in Vietnam. He shows that Kissinger was not the one-dimensional realist some have assumed based on his early academic papers combining Kantian philosophy and nineteenth-century diplomacy, but that this was not the case. Kissinger supported idealist principles, believed Prince Metternich was backward-looking, and had significant doubts about Bismarck's power tactics, according to Ferguson... Ferguson's examination of Kissinger's Vietnam record throughout the Kennedy and Johnson administrations reveals that, while he criticised the general war strategy's implementation, he never opposed it. Both Ferguson and Kissinger dismiss evidence that Kennedy was changing his mind about Vietnam and that major intra-Vietnam peace discussions were taking place in 1963. Such omissions provide the impression of historical alternatives that aren't there... Ferguson's analysis demonstrates that Kissinger and the US had unreasonable expectations for what might be accomplished at the negotiating table in 1967-68, which is a significant criticism of Kissinger and Nixon's behaviour. .. Kissinger's justifications for remaining in Vietnam were usually geopolitical rather than based on a thorough understanding of what was happening on the ground, and his view of power relations, at least during the 1950s and 1960s, paid insufficient attention to nonaligned countries' contributions to international stability. Furthermore, Kissinger saw maintaining US credibility as a practically self-sufficient rationale for keeping the war effort going. On the other hand, credibility arguments work best when their proponents are otherwise on the right track. Just as it had withstood compromises to avert nuclear war over Berlin or Cuba, the US security architecture would survive the post-Vietnam decision that military commitments would be severely limited. Instead of an excess or shortage of foreign policy realism, the Kissinger-Nixon approach to Vietnam was plagued by poor judgement.

Author (S) Details

Clark Johnson
Trade Engine LLC, USA.

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